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BIASED TUG-OF-WAR, THE BIASED INFINITY LAPLACIAN,
AND COMPARISON WITH EXPONENTIAL CONES
YUVAL PERES, GA´BOR PETE, AND STEPHANIE SOMERSILLE
Abstract. We prove that if U ⊂ Rn is an open domain whose closure U is compact
in the path metric, and F is a Lipschitz function on ∂U , then for each β ∈ R there
exists a unique viscosity solution to the β-biased infinity Laplacian equation
β|∇u|+∆∞u = 0
on U that extends F , where ∆∞u = |∇u|−2
∑
i,j uxiuxixjuxj .
In the proof, we extend the tug-of-war ideas of Peres, Schramm, Sheffield andWilson,
and define the β-biased ǫ-game as follows. The starting position is x0 ∈ U . At the
kth step the two players toss a suitably biased coin (in our key example, player I wins
with odds of exp(βǫ) to 1), and the winner chooses xk with d(xk, xk−1) < ǫ. The
game ends when xk ∈ ∂U , and player II pays the amount F (xk) to player I. We prove
that the value uǫ(x0) of this game exists, and that ‖uǫ − u‖∞ → 0 as ǫ → 0, where u
is the unique extension of F to U that satisfies comparison with β-exponential cones.
Comparison with exponential cones is a notion that we introduce here, and generalizing
a theorem of Crandall, Evans and Gariepy regarding comparison with linear cones, we
show that a continuous function satisfies comparison with β-exponential cones if and
only if it is a viscosity solution to the β-biased infinity Laplacian equation.
1. Introduction
Informally, the infinity Laplacian equation ∆∞u = 0 is the properly interpreted
Euler-Lagrange equation associated with minimizing the functional (u,X) 7→ ‖∇u‖L∞(X)
for X ⊆ Rn, and the operator
∆∞u := |∇u|−2
n∑
i,j=1
uxiuxixjuxj (1.1)
is the second derivative in the direction of the gradient ∇u = (uxi)ni=1. It was introduced
and studied by Aronsson in 1967 [Aro67, Aro68], but even the basic existence and
uniqueness questions have proven difficult, largely because of the non-smoothness of
solutions. Several approaches were developed to overcome this problem, including the
notion of viscosity solutions (see [CIL92]) and the method of comparison with cones,
developed by Crandall, Evans and Gariepy [CEG01]. It was only in 1993 that Jensen
[Jen93] showed that if U ⊂ Rn is a bounded domain, and F is a Lipschitz function on
∂U , then a continuous function u is a viscosity solution to ∆∞u = 0 if and only if it is a
so-called absolutely minimizing Lipschitz extension of F . Jensen also proved uniqueness
in this setting. See [ArCJ04] for a survey of absolutely minimizing Lipschitz extensions.
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Then, in their recent paper [PSSW09], Peres, Schramm, Sheffield and Wilson introduced
a new perspective by applying game theory to these problems. Using the game random-
tug-of-war, they proved the most general existence and uniqueness results to date for
solving equations involving the operator ∆∞. See Section 7 for more references.
In the present work, we consider an extension of the infinity Laplacian PDE, the
biased version
∆∞u+ β|∇u| = 0, β ∈ R fixed, (1.2)
which is very natural both from game theory and PDE points of view. It appears, e.g., in
[BEJ08], which considers generalizations of (1.1) that are motivated by game theory, but
does not prove any existence or uniqueness results. On the other hand, (1.2) is covered
by a general existence and uniqueness theorem of Barles and Busca [BB01], proved by
PDE methods under strong smoothness conditions on the boundary of the domain. Our
work gives a much better understanding of the corresponding game (the β-biased ǫ-
tug-of-war, where the coin is suitably biased) than [BEJ08], and, using this, proves a
more general existence and uniqueness result for (1.2) than [BB01]. Our paper follows
the general strategy of [PSSW09], but there are several new elements and difficulties
that were not present in the unbiased case, partly because the connection to absolutely
minimizing Lipschitz extensions is not there any more. The link between biased tug-of-
war and the PDE is now given by a new characterization of viscosity solutions of (1.2) in
terms of comparison with exponential cones. This comparison property also makes
it possible to state and prove extension results beyond the setting of Rn, namely, in
general length spaces. We now describe our results in detail.
For any metric space X , we can define a new metric, the path metric d(x1, x2), as
the infimum of the lengths of all continuous paths from x1 to x2 which are contained
in X . A metric space is called a length space if it is equipped with this path metric.
Note that the closure of a bounded domain U ⊂ Rn is not necessarily compact in the
path metric; an example is an infinite inward spiral. On the other hand, the union of a
finite number of convex closed sets in Rn is a compact length space.
Given a length space X , some Y ⊂ X , a real function F on Y , a small ǫ > 0, and any
ρ(ǫ) > 0, the biased ǫ-tug-of-war game is defined as follows. The starting position
is x0 ∈ X\Y . At the kth step the two players toss a biased coin which player I wins
with odds of ρ(ǫ) to 1, i.e., with probability ρ(ǫ)/(ρ(ǫ) + 1), and the winner chooses xk
with d(xk, xk−1) < ǫ. (Even if X ⊂ Rn, the moves are measured in the path metric
of X , not in the Euclidean metric.) The game ends when xk ∈ Y , and player II pays
the amount F (xk) to player I. Assuming that the value of this game exists (defined and
proved below), it is denoted by uǫ(x0).
In particular, for any fixed β ∈ R, a β-biased ǫ-tug-of-war game is defined by
assuming that the odds function satisfies the following:
ρ(x) is a smooth function with ρ(0) = 1 and ρ′(0) = β,
whose logarithm is concave or convex.
(1.3)
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Note that if the probability for player I to win a coin toss is 1+θ(ǫ)
2
, then we have
ρ(ǫ) =
1 + θ(ǫ)
1− θ(ǫ) and θ(ǫ) =
ρ(ǫ)− 1
ρ(ǫ) + 1
. (1.4)
A natural example is θ(ǫ) = βǫ/2, but for reasons that will be explained shortly, the
most important example for us will be
ρ0(ǫ) := e
βǫ and θ0(ǫ) := tanh
βǫ
2
=
eβǫ − 1
eβǫ + 1
=
βǫ
2
− (βǫ)
3
24
+O(βǫ)5 .
Our main result is the following. For the definition of viscosity solutions, see Section 6.
Theorem 1.1. Let U ⊂ Rn be an open domain with closure X = U compact in the path
metric, and let F be a Lipschitz function on Y = ∂U . Fix β ∈ R. Then there exists a
unique extension of F to X that is a viscosity solution of (1.2) on U . This solution is
the uniform limit of the value functions uǫ(x) for the β-biased ǫ-tug-of-war games on X.
Let us point out that, unlike for the unbiased equation, the compactness assumption on
X cannot be dropped. For instance, equation (1.2) in R takes the form u′′(x)+β|u′(x)| =
0, so, ifX = [0,∞), Y = {0} and F (0) = 0, then the functions u(x) = sgn(β)A(1−e−|β|x)
with A ∈ R≥0 are all bounded extensions on X solving (1.2). These one-dimensional
β-exponential functions will in fact play a crucial role in the sequel.
Definition 1.1. Given β ∈ R, A ≥ 0, and x0 ∈ X in a length space, we define
C+x0(x) := sgn(β)A
(
1− e−β d(x0,x)) ≥ 0, (1.5)
C−x0(x) := sgn(β)A
(
1− eβ d(x0,x)) ≤ 0 .
For any B ∈ R, the functions C+x0(x)+B and C−x0(x)+B are called positive and negative
β-exponential cones centered at x0 with “slope” A.
Figure 1. The positive and negative β-exponential cones for β > 0 on
R
2, and the two shown together.
In Rn with the Euclidean metric d(x, y), a β-exponential cone (1.5) solves (1.2) away
from x0. In R, the unique positive β-exponential cone centered at 0 and with values
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C+0 (0) = 0 and C
+
0 (1) = 1, namely C
+
0 (x) =
1−e−β|x|
1−e−β , coincides on x ∈ [0, 1] with
C−1 (x) =
eβ−eβ|x−1|
eβ−1 , the negative β-exponential cone that is centered at 1 and has those
values at 0 and 1. This function is easily seen to be the ǫ→ 0 limit of the value function
for the β-biased ǫ-game on X = [0, 1], Y = {0, 1}, with F (0) = 0 and F (1) = 1, where
the optimal strategies are obvious, and the game-play is just a biased random walk.
Definition 1.2. A function u : X \ Y −→ R satisfies comparison with β-exponential
cones from above (CECA) if for any V ⊂⊂ X\Y (i.e., V is a bounded open subset of X at
a positive distance from Y ), x0 ∈ X, ι ∈ {+,−} and B ∈ R, whenever u(x) ≤ Cιx0(x)+B
holds on x ∈ ∂(V \ {x0}), we also have u ≤ Cιx0 +B on the entire V . Comparison with
β-exponential cones from below (CECB) is defined analogously. If both conditions hold,
then u satisfies comparison with β-exponential cones (CEC).
The following equivalence is a generalization of the main observation of [CEG01].
Theorem 1.2. Given an open connected U ⊂ Rn, a continuous function u : U −→ R is
a viscosity solution of (1.2) iff it satisfies comparison with β-exponential cones.
Given this characterization of viscosity solutions, Theorem 1.1 is an immediate con-
sequence of the following more general result.
Theorem 1.3. Let X be a compact length space, with a specified closed subset Y ⊂ X
and F a Lipschitz function on Y . Fix β ∈ R. Then there exists a unique extension of
F to X that satisfies comparison with β-exponential cones on X \ Y ; it is the uniform
limit of the value functions uǫ for the β-biased ǫ-tug-of-war games on X.
To prove convergence of the value functions uǫ(x), one would like to compare them
for different values of ǫ. It is unclear how to do this in general, but it works for ǫ and
2ǫ as follows. One can view the ǫ-game in rounds: until one player wins two more coin
tosses than the other. The results of these rounds can then be considered as moves in
the 2ǫ-game. The odds for player I to win a round is ρ(ǫ)2 to 1; this is because the
coin toss trajectories (Tk := number of flips won by player I minus those won by player
II in k steps) that end with player I gaining the advantage of two flips are exactly the
Tk 7→ −Tk reflections of the other trajectories, and each has probability ρ(ǫ)2 times that
of the reflected one. So, if we want to mimic the 2ǫ-game exactly, we need ρ(ǫ)2 = ρ(2ǫ).
The simplest solution of this equation is ρ0(ǫ) = e
βǫ, which explains the special role of this
odds function. More generally, if (1.3) holds, we will be able to show monotonicity and
hence pointwise convergence of the value functions along dyadic subsequences ǫn = ǫ/2
n,
which will be the first step towards full convergence in the sup-norm.
Another manifestation of the special role of the odds function ρ0(ǫ) = e
βǫ and the
corresponding bias θ0(ǫ) is the following. If we perform a biased random walk (Xn)n≥0
on R with steps ±ǫ, with bias θ0(ǫ) to the right, and u(x) := a(1 − e−βx) is a one-
dimensional β-biased infinity harmonic function, then u(Xn) is exactly a martingale.
We now define the value functions uǫI for player I, and u
ǫ
II for player II. A strategy
for a player is a way of choosing the player’s next move as a function of all previous coin
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tosses and moves. Given two strategies, SI for player I and SII for player II, we define
the payoff functions F+(SI ,SII) and F−(SI ,SII) as the expected payoff at the end of the
game if the game terminates with probability one under these strategies. So, in this case
they are equal. However, we let F−(SI ,SII) = −∞ and F+(SI ,SII) =∞ otherwise. We
think of uǫI as the minimum that player I can guarantee being paid; on the other hand,
player II can avoid having to pay more than the value uǫII . More precisely,
uǫI := sup
SI
inf
SII
F−(SI ,SII) ,
uǫII := infSII
sup
SI
F+(SI ,SII) .
These values are functions of the starting location x ∈ X . Clearly, uǫI(x) ≤ uǫII(x). If
they are equal, we say the game has a value, and denote it by uǫ(x) := uǫI(x) = u
ǫ
II(x).
The organization of the paper into sections is based on the following six main steps
of the proof. For readers familiar with [PSSW09], we point out in brackets the main
differences compared to the unbiased case.
(1) θ(ǫ)-infinity harmonicity: The value functions uǫI(x) and u
ǫ
II(x) are θ(ǫ)-
infinity harmonic (defined below).
(2) Game value existence: The ǫ-game has a value, i.e., uǫ(x) := uǫI(x) = u
ǫ
II(x),
for any θ(ǫ) ∈ [−1, 1]. [To ensure finite stopping times, the backtracking argu-
ment now needs to be much more elaborate. In particular, the compactness of
X is used in a crucial way.]
(3) Convergence: The pointwise limit u˜ǫ,ρ := limn→∞ uǫ/2
n
exists, provided con-
dition (1.3) holds. [The advantage given to one of the players becomes greater,
hence harder to control, in one of the so-called “favored” games in Section 3.]
(4) Comparison with β-exponential cones:
(a) The value function uǫ approximately satisfies comparison with β-exponential
cones. [The proof requires that sometimes the weaker player pulls towards
a target; this is a reasonable strategy again because X is compact.]
(b) The approximate CEC property provides enough regularity to conclude that,
under (1.3), uǫ/2
n
converges not only pointwise, but also uniformly. [Improv-
ing the convergence from pointwise to uniform needs the regularity because
we are allowing a wider class of biases, not just the nicest example ρ0(ǫ).]
(c) Any uniform subsequential limit limn→∞ uǫn satisfies CEC exactly.
(5) Uniqueness: Any extension u of F that satisfies comparison with β-exponential
cones on X \Y is equal to the dyadic limit u˜ǫ,ρ0 . [Here it is important to consider
the games with odds function exactly ρ0(ǫ).] Hence all extensions u and all limits
u˜ǫ,ρ are the same, independently of ρ(·) and ǫ > 0.
(6) Equivalence: In the Rn case, a function satisfies CEC if and only if it is a
viscosity solution to (1.2). [This generalizes [CEG01].]
Finally, Section 7 collects some open problems.
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In what follows, without loss of generality, we may assume that β > 0 and ǫ is small
enough, hence the coin favors player I, and 1
2
< 1+θ(ǫ)
2
< 1.
We now define θ(ǫ)-infinity harmonicity, the discrete analogue of having a constant
drift in the direction of the gradient, and prove Item (1) above.
Starting from x0, if player I wins the first coin toss and moves to some x1, then
conditioned on this event, he now has a strategy that guarantees a payoff arbitrarily
close to uǫI(x1), but does not have a strategy that guarantees more. The same is true if
player II wins the first coin toss, and moves to some x1 of his choice. The value u
ǫ
I(x1)
of the first choice is between the infimum and the supremum of uǫI over the ball Bǫ(x0),
and can be arbitrarily close to these two extreme values. The same argument can be
repeated for uǫII , and we obtain:
Lemma 1.4. For all x in X\Y , both uǫI and uǫII satisfy
u(x) =
1 + θ(ǫ)
2
sup
y∈Bǫ(x)
u(y) +
1− θ(ǫ)
2
inf
y∈Bǫ(x)
u(y) . (1.6)

We say that u is θ(ǫ)-infinity harmonic if it satisfies equation (1.6). Notice that the
term ǫ in “θ(ǫ)-infinity harmonic” indicates both the bias and the size of the balls.
The supremum of the possible increases in the ǫ-ball around x is denoted by δ+(x) :=
supy∈Bǫ(x) u(y) − u(x). Similarly, the supremum of the possible decreases is δ−(x) :=
u(x)− infy∈Bǫ(x) u(y). Notice that, for a θ(ǫ)-infinity harmonic function u, equation (1.6)
implies that these values are related by the equation
δ+(x) =
1− θ(ǫ)
1 + θ(ǫ)
δ−(x) =
δ−(x)
ρ(ǫ)
, (1.7)
and we see that δ+(x) < δ−(x).
We will sometimes use the modified metric dǫ(x, y), which is ǫ times the minimum
number of steps of size less than ǫ to get from x to y; for x 6= y this is ǫ+ ǫ⌊d(x, y)/ǫ⌋.
Let us remark here that we use open ǫ-balls for the steps because, in Section 3 , we will
need that any 2ǫ-step can be broken into two ǫ-steps without touching Y in between.
Whenever we write f = O(g) for two functions, we mean that f ≤ Cg, where the
constant C ∈ (0,∞) might depend on β and X, Y, F .
2. Game value existence
We will always assume that X is a compact length space, Y ⊂ X is closed, and
F : Y −→ R is Lipschitz.
Lemma 2.1. uǫI is the smallest θ(ǫ)-infinity harmonic function bounded from below on
X that extends F . More generally, if v is a θ(ǫ)-harmonic function which is bounded
from below on X and v ≥ F on Y , then v ≥ uǫI on X.
Similarly, uǫII is the largest θ(ǫ)-infinity harmonic function which is bounded from
above on X and extends F .
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Proof. From Lemma 1.4 we know that uǫI is θ(ǫ)-infinity harmonic. It is bounded below
because player I can fix a y ∈ Y and adopt a “pull toward y” strategy which at each move
attempts to minimize the distance of the game position to y. In an infinite series of coin
tosses there will be a time when player I has won more tosses by the amount dǫ(x0, y)/ǫ,
therefore he can ensure that the game terminates. Hence uǫI(x0) ≥ infY F > −∞. Of
course infY F > −∞ because F is a Lipschitz function and Y is compact.
Suppose v ≥ F on Y . Suppose also that v is θ(ǫ)-harmonic and bounded below on
X . In order to show that v ≥ uǫI = supSI infSII F−(SI ,SII), we must show that for every
SI there exists an SII such that v ≥ F−(SI ,SII). We may assume that SI is a strategy
that ensures that the game terminates — otherwise F−(SI ,SII) = −∞ for some SII and
the assertion is obvious. We select SII such that if player II wins the kth coin toss he
moves to xk where v(xk) < infy∈Bǫ(xk−1) v(y) +
δ
2k
. In other words, he plays to “almost”
minimize v. Now notice that Mk = v(xk) + δ2
−k is a supermartingale with respect to
the filtration Fk generated by the first k coin tosses and moves:
E[Mk|Fk−1] ≤ 1 + θ(ǫ)
2
sup
y∈Bǫ(xk−1)
v(y) +
1− θ(ǫ)
2
(
inf
y∈Bǫ(xk−1)
v(y) +
δ
2k
)
+
δ
2k
= v(xk−1) +
(
1− θ(ǫ)
2
+ 1
)
δ
2k
< v(xk−1) + 2
δ
2k
= v(xk−1) +
δ
2k−1
= Mk−1 ,
where the equality follows because v is θ(ǫ)-harmonic.
Let τ := inf{k : xk ∈ Y }; we have assumed that SI an SII are such that τ < ∞
a.s. Since Mk is a supermartingale bounded from below, an optional sampling theorem
(proved by monotone convergence and Fatou’s lemma) gives E[Mτ ] ≤ E[M0] and we
have
F−(SI ,SII) = E[F (xτ )] ≤ E[v(xτ )] ≤ E[Mτ ] ≤ E[M0] = v(x0) + δ,
where δ was arbitrary, hence uǫI(x0) ≤ v(x0). 
Theorem 2.2. For X, Y, F as before, for any ǫ > 0 and θ(ǫ) ∈ [−1, 1], we have uǫI = uǫII,
i.e., the ǫ-game has a value.
Proof. We know that uǫI ≤ uǫII always holds, so we need to show uǫI ≥ uǫII . As in
Lemma 2.1, we know that uǫII ≤ supY F < ∞. We let u = uǫII . Recall that δ+(x) =
supy∈Bǫ(x) u(y)−u(x); we will use the shorthand notation δk := δ+(xk). We first assume
that the infima and suprema in the definition of θ(ǫ)-harmonicity are achieved for all
x ∈ X , and that δ0 > 0. Always achieving the extrema is of course unrealistic, especially
since the balls Bǫ(x) are open. However, this way the formulas will be simpler and the
main ideas clearer — later we will remove these assumptions.
For m ∈ Z+ ∪ {∞}, a finite or infinite sequence (xi : 0 ≤ i < m) of possible ǫ-game
positions in X \Y is called a maximal chain if the following holds: u(xk+1) = u(xk)+ δk
for k < m, and if m < ∞, then the chain cannot be continued, i.e., all points xm ∈ X
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with u(xm) = u(xm−1) + δm−1 are in fact in Y . Notice that u(xk+2) > u(xk+1) and,
since the maximal value in Bǫ(xk) was attained at xk+1, the point xk+2 cannot be in
Bǫ(xk). Similarly, xj is not in Bǫ(xk) for any j ≥ k + 2. So, for every k 6= j we have
d(x2k, x2j) ≥ ǫ, i.e., the open balls Bǫ/2(x2k) are all disjoint. Now, since X is compact,
there exists a finite covering of it by open ǫ/4-balls. Each ball Bǫ/2(x2k) contains one of
these ǫ/4-balls entirely, hence there are more ǫ/4-balls in the covering than points x2k.
Therefore, there is a uniform finite upper bound M = M(ǫ) on the cardinality of any
maximal chain {x0, x1, x2, ..., xm−1}, which is independent of the starting point x0.
We now choose δ small enough so that ρMδ < δ0, where ρ = ρ(ǫ). We let A0 := Y and
for n > 0 we let An :=
{
x ∈ X : ∃z ∈ An−1 with d(z, x) < ǫ and u(z) = supy∈Bǫ(x) u(y) >
u(x) + ρn−1δ
}
. Finally, A :=
⋃M
n=0An.
Notice that x0 is in A. For, if {x0, x1, x2, ..., xm−1} is the maximal chain described
above, then its length is at most M . The θ(ǫ)-harmonicity condition for u and (1.7)
imply inductively that δm−1 ≥ ρ−m+1δ0 ≥ ρ−M+1δ0 > δ, so xm−1 is in A1 and hence x0
is in A. Similarly, every x 6∈ A satisfies δ+(x) ≤ ρM−1δ.
For each n, we let jn := max{j ≤ n : xj ∈ A} and vn := xjn ; this is the last position
in A up to time n.
We need to show that there exists an SI such that for every SII , we have F−(SI ,SII) ≥
u. To that end, we let SII be an arbitrary strategy and we let SI be the following strategy
for player I. When xn is not in A and player I wins the coin toss he backtracks toward
A by moving to a previous game position that is closer to vn. That is, he moves to
any position in {xjn, xjn+1, ..., xn−1} which is within ǫ of xn and is closer to vn than xn.
When xn is in A, he maximizes u within A as much as possible.
We let dn be the minimum number of steps of length less than ǫ required to get from
xn to vn by only moving to previous game positions. We define
mn := u(vn) + (n− dn) ρMδ . (2.1)
We claim that mn is a submartingale.
Case I. We consider the case where xn ∈ A and so mn = u(xn) + nρMδ.
1. If player I wins the coin toss, then his strategy determines that mn+1 = u(xn+1) +
(n+ 1)ρMδ = u(xn) + δn + (n+ 1)ρ
Mδ > mn + δn.
2. a. If II wins the coin toss and moves to another position xn+1 ∈ A, then mn+1 =
u(xn+1) + (n+ 1)ρ
Mδ ≥ u(xn)− ρδn + (n + 1)ρMδ > mn − ρδn.
b. If he moves to a position outside of A, then mn+1 = u(xn)+((n+1)−1)ρMδ = mn.
Thus, in this case mn is a submartingale, since
E[mn+1|Fn] ≥ 1 + θ(ǫ)
2
(mn + δn) +
1− θ(ǫ)
2
(
mn − 1 + θ(ǫ)
1− θ(ǫ)δn
)
= mn .
Case II. We next consider the case where xn is not in A and mn = u(vn)+(n−dn)ρMδ,
with dn > 0.
1. If player I wins the coin toss, then his strategy determines that he moves at least
one ǫ step closer to vn. Hence mn+1 ≥ u(vn) + (n + 1− (dn − 1))ρMδ = mn + 2ρMδ.
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2. a. If II wins the coin toss and moves to another position not in A, we have
mn+1 ≥ u(vn) + ((n+ 1)− (dn + 1))ρMδ = mn.
b. If II wins and moves back into A, then we have
mn+1 = u(xn+1) + (n+ 1)ρ
Mδ
≥ u(xn)− ρδn + (n + 1)ρMδ
≥ u(xn) + nρMδ ≥ u(vn) + (n− dn)ρMδ = mn ;
from the second to the third line we used that δn ≤ ρM−1δ, since xn 6∈ A, while in the
third line we used that there is a path between xn and vn with at most dn steps, each
outside A, hence having a value difference at most ρMδ.
Altogether, in Case II we also have
E[mn+1|Fn] ≥ mn .
Hence mn is indeed a submartingale. We let τ be the first time a terminal state is
reached. We have that for all n, E[mn∧τ ] ≥ E[m0] = u(x0).
We now show that Eτ is finite, so that EF (xτ ) ≥ u(x0).
Whenever the game position is in A, there is an independent chance that player I will
win the necessary tosses in a row (some number at most M) and end the game. So the
number of steps in A is stochastically bounded by Mµ where µ is a geometric random
variable with success probability (1+θ(ǫ)
2
)M . Consequently, the expected number of steps
inside A is at most E[Mµ] =M( 2
1+θ(ǫ)
)M .
Each outside run is stochastically bounded by an independent random variable ξk,
the length of a random walk on the nonnegative integers started from 1 until hitting 0,
where the probability of moving to the left is 1+θ(ǫ)
2
and to the right is 1−θ(ǫ)
2
. We know
that Eξk =
1
θ(ǫ)
.
The number of runs outside A is bounded by the number of steps in A. This gives
Eτ ≤ E(
∑
k≤Mµ
ξk +Mµ).
By Wald’s Lemma we have that E
∑
k≤Mµ ξk ≤M( 21+θ(ǫ))M 1θ(ǫ) , and so
Eτ ≤ M
(
2
1 + θ(ǫ)
)M (
1
θ(ǫ)
+ 1
)
=: T .
So Emτ ≥ Em0 = u(x0).
Recall that we have seen that u(xn) ≥ mn − nρMδ for all xn, by considering the path
between xn and vn outside A.
Summarizing, we have that
EF (xτ ) ≥ Emτ − ρMδ Eτ ≥ m0 − ρMδT = u(x0)− ρMδT . (2.2)
Since δ can be made arbitrarily small, we have EF (xτ ) ≥ u(x0) = uǫII(x0). Thus
uǫI ≥ uǫII , and, in the case where the suprema and infima are achieved, we are done.
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We now remove the assumption that the extrema are achieved, but still assume that
δ0 = δ
+(x0) > 0. Recall that there is a uniform bound M = M(ǫ) on the length of any
sequence {x0, x1, . . . , xm−1} where d(xj, xk) ≥ ǫ for j ≥ k+2. Let δ, η > 0 be small reals
such that
δ > (ρ+ 2)η and δ0 > ρ
M(δ +Mη) . (2.3)
Now, given xk, choose xk+1 to be a point in Bǫ(xk) with
u(xk+1) > u(xk) + δk − ρM−kη . (2.4)
We claim that u(xk+1) ≥ u(xk) and u(xk+2) > u(xk) + δk, therefore d(xj , xk) ≥ ǫ for
j ≥ k + 2, and the sequence must reach Y in at most M steps.
By (1.7) and (2.4), we have δk+1 ≥ ρ−1(u(xk+1) − u(xk)) > ρ−1(δk − ρM−kη). This
and the second inequality of (2.3) give by induction that
δk > ρ
M−k(δ + (M − k)η) . (2.5)
Combining this and (2.4) gives u(xk+1) ≥ u(xk) immediately. To show u(xk+2) > u(xk)+
δk, we use (2.4) twice to write u(xk+2) in terms of u(xk), then using (2.5) for δk+1 we
arrive at the following inequality to verify: ρM−k−1
(
δ + (M − k − 2 − ρ)η) > 0, which
always holds by the first inequality of (2.3), and our claim is proved.
This argument shows that if we now define the set A :=
⋃M
n=0An by A0 := Y and
An :=
{
x ∈ X : δ+(x) > ρn−1(δ + (n− 1)η), and
∃z ∈ An−1 with d(z, x) < ǫ and u(z) > u(x) + δ+(x)− ρn−1η
}
,
then x0 ∈ A, and similarly, x 6∈ A implies δ+(x) ≤ ρM(δ +Mη).
The strategy for player I now will be the following: if xn ∈ A, say xn ∈ Ai, then try to
step to a point z ∈ Ai−1 with u(z) > u(xn)+ δn−ρi−1η; if xn 6∈ A, then try to backtrack
towards the last visit vn to A, as before. We also slightly modify the definition (2.1),
and claim that now
mn := u(vn) + (n− dn) ρM(δ +Mη)
is a submartingale. The proof remains the same, with two small modifications. Firstly, in
Case I.1, we have only u(xn+1) > u(xn)+δn−ρMη, but then (n+1)ρM(δ+Mη)−ρMη >
nρM (δ+Mη) still gives us what we need. Secondly, in Case II.2.b, the path between xn
and vn now makes possible a value difference at most dnρ
M(δ +Mη), but we changed
the definition of mn exactly in order to accommodate this difference.
The proof is completed by noting that given ǫ > 0, the term ρM(δ +Mη)T in the
present version of (2.2) can be made arbitrarily small by choosing δ and η small.
Finally, if δ0 = 0, we fix y ∈ Y and let player I pull toward y until a position x∗0 with
δ+(x∗0) > 0 is reached or the game terminates. Note that the first such x
∗
0 encountered
has u(x∗0) = u(x0). If x
∗
0 ∈ Y , then F (x∗0) = u(x0), and player I achieved the payoff
u(x0). If x
∗
0 ∈ X\Y , then player I plays the above strategy with x∗0 replacing x0, and
can achieve the payoff u(x∗0) = u(x0) in expectation. This concludes the proof. 
BIASED TUG-OF-WAR AND THE BIASED INFINITY LAPLACIAN 11
Corollary 2.3. uǫ = uǫI = u
ǫ
II is the unique bounded θ(ǫ)-infinity harmonic function
agreeing with F on Y .
Proof. By Lemma 2.1 we have that uǫI is the smallest such function and u
ǫ
II is the largest.
By Theorem 2.2 they are equal. Thus the function is unique. 
3. uǫ/2
n
Convergence
We seek to prove that uǫ/2
n
converges as n ∈ N tends to ∞. However, it is not the
case that uǫ/2
n
(x) is monotone for each x ∈ X , so, as in [PSSW09], we define a new game
that does possess this property, the biased II-favored ǫ-tug-of-war. In this game, player
II has some advantages: if he wins the coin toss, he is allowed to choose the next game
position in a ball larger than the usual one; otherwise he still has the option to slightly
modify the move of player I, provided that his modification terminates the game.
More precisely, the biased II-favored ǫ-tug-of-war is defined as follows. At the kth step,
player I chooses zk in Bǫ(xk−1). If player I wins the coin toss, then player II can choose
xk ∈ (B2ǫ(zk) ∩ Y ) ∪ {zk}. In other words, he moves to zk or terminates the game. If
player II wins the coin toss he moves to a position in B2ǫ(zk) of his choice.
The value to player I of the biased II-favored ǫ tug-of-war is denoted by vǫ. The value
to player II of the correspondingly defined biased I-favored ǫ tug-of-war game is denoted
by wǫ. In both cases, the bias is 1+θ(ǫ)
2
, favoring player I.
As the names suggest, player I cannot do better in the II-favored game than in the
ordinary game. In other words, vǫ ≤ uǫI . This is because given any strategy for player II
in the ordinary ǫ-game, player II can follow it also in the II-favored game, since for any
z ∈ Bǫ(x) we have Bǫ(x) ⊆ B2ǫ(z). Similarly, player II cannot do better in the I-favored
game than in the ordinary game (he cannot ensure a value that is smaller than the value
in the ordinary game), so uǫII ≤ wǫ. Hence we have vǫ ≤ uǫI = uǫII ≤ wǫ. Moreover, the
following lemma holds:
Lemma 3.1. If ρ(·) is log-concave, then, for any ǫ > 0,
v2ǫ ≤ vǫ ≤ uǫ ≤ wǫ.
If ρ(·) is log-convex, then
vǫ ≤ uǫ ≤ wǫ ≤ w2ǫ.
Proof. The inequalities vǫ ≤ uǫ ≤ wǫ were already shown above. We now prove v2ǫ ≤ vǫ
for the case when ρ(·) is log-concave. The argument for wǫ ≤ w2ǫ is analogous.
Given any strategy S2ǫI for player I in the II-favored 2ǫ-game, he can mimic it in the
II-favored ǫ-game as follows. Whenever he would choose a target point z ∈ B2ǫ(x) in
S2ǫI , in the ǫ-game he aims towards z until what we will call “a round”: until one player
wins two more coin tosses than the other. This person will be player I with odds ρ(ǫ)2,
as we explained in the Introduction (or as follows from the computation in Lemma 3.4
below). Note that log-concavity implies that ρ(ǫ)2 ≥ ρ(2ǫ), hence the odds for player I
to win a round is larger than his odds for a single coin toss in the 2ǫ-game.
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Now, if player I wins the round, the game position will be z, or in Y ∩B4ǫ(z) if player
II ended the game during this round; otherwise, it will be within B4ǫ(z), as is easily
checked. Therefore, player II has at most as many choices if he wins the round as he
had upon winning a coin toss in the 2ǫ-game. Altogether, player I can do at least as
well with this strategy as in the 2ǫ-game, and we are done. 
Thus, if ρ(·) is log-concave, then (vǫ/2n)n is monotone increasing, hence its pointwise
limit exists, while if ρ(·) is log-convex, then limn→∞wǫ/2n exists. However, a priori these
limits could be +∞ or −∞ sometimes, may not be the same even if both exist, and
could depend on ρ(·) and ǫ.
Lemma 3.2. Let ǫ > 0. Then for each x ∈ X and y ∈ Y ,
vǫ(x) ≥ F (y)− (2ǫ+ dǫ(x, y))LipY F.
Such an expected payoff is guaranteed for player I if he adopts a “pull towards y” strategy
which at each move attempts to reduce dǫ(xk, y).
Proof. Given x = x0 ∈ X and y ∈ Y , the “pull towards y” strategy for player I in the
II-favored game ensures that the game ends almost surely in finite time τ <∞, and that
dǫ(xn, y) is a supermartingale, except at the last step where player II may have moved
the game position up to ǫ farther from y even if player I won the coin toss. This implies
E[dǫ(xτ , y)] < d
ǫ(x, y) + 2ǫ.
Since F is Lipschitz on Y , we get
E[F (xτ )] ≥ F (y)− (dǫ(x, y) + 2ǫ)LipY F .
Since vǫ is at least as great as the expected payoff under this pull toward y strategy, the
lemma is proved. 
We define dǫ(X) = supx1,x2∈X d
ǫ(x1, x2). Since X has finite diameter (diamX) in the
path metric, we have dǫ(X) <∞; in fact, limǫ→0 dǫ(X) = diamX .
Lemma 3.3. If x ∈ X , y ∈ Y and dǫ(x, y) = ǫ, then
uǫ(x) ≤ F (y) + ρ(ǫ)dǫ(X)/ǫ ǫLipY F ≤ F (y) +O(1) eβ diamX ǫLipY F,
with an absolute constant O(1).
Proof. Let u = uǫI . Let γ = u(x)− F (y) > 0. (If γ ≤ 0, we are done).
As in the proof of Theorem 2.2, we first assume that the infima and suprema in
the definition of θ(ǫ)-harmonicity are always achieved. Then there is a path {x =
x0, x1, x2, ...} of maximal ascent, i.e., for each k, we have u(xk) = supz∈Bǫ(xk−1) u(z).
Since X is bounded, this sequence is finite and ends at some y′ ∈ Y .
Let d be the minimal number of steps of size less than ǫ required to get from x to y′,
i.e., d = dǫ(x, y′)/ǫ. So y′ = xn for some n ≥ d.
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We let δk = u(xk+1)−u(xk) be the maximal possible increase of u in the ǫ-ball around
xk. Recall that at each step, δk ≥ δk−1/ρ(ǫ) and δ0 ≥ γ/ρ(ǫ). So δk ≥ ρ(ǫ)−(k+1)γ, hence
F (y′) ≥ u(x0) +
n−1∑
k=0
ρ(ǫ)−(k+1)γ ≥ u(x0) +
d∑
k=1
ρ(ǫ)−kγ.
On the other hand, d(y, y′) ≤ dǫ(y, y′) ≤ (d+ 1)ǫ, and since F is Lipschitz, we have
F (y′) ≤ F (y) + (d+ 1)ǫLipY F.
Combining these two inequalities and using u(x0)− F (y) = γ, we get
(d+ 1)ǫLipY F ≥
d∑
k=0
ρ(ǫ)−kγ ≥ (d+ 1)ρ(ǫ)−dγ ≥ (d+ 1)ρ(ǫ)−dǫ(X)/ǫγ,
and so
ρ(ǫ)d
ǫ(X)/ǫ ǫLipY F ≥ γ.
Thus, in the case where the infima and suprema are achieved, we are done.
If the infima and suprema are not achieved, we fix η, δ > 0 small enough for (2.3) to
hold, with our M = M(ǫ) as before. (Note here that we had γ > 0, hence also δ0 > 0.)
We now define our sequence {x0, x1, x2, ...} such that each xk satisfies (2.4). Similarly
to what we did after (2.4), we have δk+1 ≥ ρ−1(δk − ρM−kη), which by induction gives
δk+1 ≥ ρ−(k+1)δ0 − (k + 1)ρM−k−1η. Since δ0 ≥ γ/ρ, we get
F (y′) ≥ u(x0) +
d−1∑
k=0
(
δk − ρM−kη
) ≥ u(x0) + d−1∑
k=0
(
ρ−(k+1)γ − (k + 1)ρM−kη)
≥ u(x0) +
d∑
k=1
ρ−kγ − d2ρMη .
Since d ≤M , from this we get in the same way as above that
ρ(ǫ)d
ǫ(X)/ǫ ǫLipY F ≥ γ −MρMη .
Since η was arbitrary, the proof is complete. 
Some version of the above lemma is probably valid also for wǫ in place of uǫ, but we
prove instead a weaker but more general bound for wǫ, not using the boundedness of X .
Lemma 3.4. If x ∈ X and y ∈ Y with dǫ(x, y) = η ∈ [ǫ, 1), then, for small enough ǫ,
we have wǫ(x) ≤ F (y) +√η (LipY F + exp(4β√η) supy′∈Y F (y′)).
Proof. In the I-favored game, let player II pull toward y. The probability that player I
gets
√
η distance away from x before the game ends is at most O(
√
η), which can be seen
as follows. Let k = ⌊√η/ǫ⌋ − 1 and ℓ = η/ǫ ∈ Z+. Let R0 = 0, and R−j = −
∑j
i=1 ρ
−i
for 0 < j ≤ k, and Rj =
∑j−1
i=0 ρ
i for 0 < j ≤ ℓ. Consider the one-dimensional game
that starts at R0, player I moves to the left with probability
1+θ(ǫ)
2
, player II moves to
the right with probability 1−θ(ǫ)
2
, and the end is τ = inf{n : xn = R−k or xn = Rℓ}.
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Let q be the probability that xτ = R−k. This upper bounds the probability that player
I will get
√
η ≥ (k + 1)ǫ distance away from x before the original (I-favored) game
ends. The position in the one-dimensional game is a martingale, so 0 = Ex0 = Exτ =
qR−k + (1− q)Rℓ. Hence
q =
Rℓ
Rℓ − R−k <
ℓρℓ−1
(k + ℓ)ρ−k
<
η/ǫ√
η/ǫ− 1 ρ(ǫ)
√
η/ǫ+η/ǫ <
√
η exp(4β
√
η) ,
where the last inequality uses that ρ(ǫ) < 1 + 2βǫ for ǫ small.
Now, since all points in Y which are less than k steps away from x have value at most
F (y) + kǫLipY F , we have
wǫ(x) ≤ F (y) +√η LipY F +
√
η exp(4β
√
η) sup
y′∈Y
F (y′) ,
and we are done. 
Proposition 3.5. ‖vǫ − uǫ‖∞ = O(ǫ).
Proof. We will closely follow the proof of [PSSW09, Lemma 3.3].
We play a virtual ordinary game, and player I’s strategy in the favored game will mimic
his strategy in the virtual game so that the game positions stay close (within ǫ of each
other). More precisely, we first fix a strategy SI for player I in the ordinary ǫ-game that
guarantees an expected payoff of at least uǫI−ǫ against any strategy of player II. (In other
words, F−(SI ,SII) ≥ uǫI − ǫ for any SII .) Then, we will select a strategy SFI for player I
in the favored game which does almost as well as SI , in the sense that for any strategy
SFII for player II, there will exist an SII such that F−(SFI ,SFII) ≥ F−(SI ,SII) − O(ǫ) ≥
uǫI − O(ǫ), where the last inequality is by our assumption on SI . Thus we will have
vǫ ≥ uǫI −O(ǫ). Combining this with uǫI ≥ vǫ from Lemma 3.1, we will have the desired
result.
We let the superscript F denote positions in the favored game. We begin both games
at the same position. In other words, we let xF0 = x0. Our strategy SFI will satisfy by
induction that d(xFn , xn) < ǫ for each n, as long as both games are running.
Assuming this for some n, at step n + 1 player I chooses zFn+1 = xn. In other words,
he aims for the current state in the virtual game.
If player I wins the coin toss, then xFn+1 = z
F
n+1 = xn (as long as the game has not
terminated), and in the virtual game xn+1 is chosen according to SI . Hence d(xn+1, xn) <
ǫ, and thus d(xFn+1, xn+1) < ǫ.
If player II wins the coin toss, then he chooses some xFn+1 according to his SFII , sat-
isfying d(xFn+1, xn) < 2ǫ. Then, in the strategy SII we are constructing, player II picks
xn+1 such that d(x
F
n+1, xn+1) < ǫ and d(xn, xn+1) < ǫ.
So, the game positions stay “close” in either case.
If the virtual ordinary game terminates before the favored game does, in SFI we let
player I pull towards the terminal position of the virtual game. If the favored game
terminates before the virtual one, then in SII we let player II pull towards the final
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position of the favored game. We let τ be the time the virtual game ends and let τF be
the time when the favored game ends.
Case I. If τ = τF , then xτ and xFτ are in Y with |xτ − xFτF | < ǫ, and since F is
Lipschitz, we have
|F (xτ)− F (xFτF )| < ǫLipǫY F.
Case II. If τ < τF , then xτ ∈ Y while xFτ 6∈ Y , but still d(xτ , xFτ ) < ǫ. Player I
continues by pulling towards xτ , and Lemma 3.2 tells us that the conditional expected
value E
[
F (xτF ) | xτ
]
to player I of the II-favored ǫ-game thus played is at least
F (xτ )− (2ǫ+ dǫ(xτ , xFτ ))LipY F ≥ F (xτ )− 3ǫLipY F .
Case III. If τF < τ , then xFτF ∈ Y and xτF 6∈ Y . Let y = xFτF and z = xτF ; recall that
d(y, z) < ǫ. By Lemma 3.3, we have
uǫI(z) ≤ F (y) +O(1) eβ diamX ǫLipY F.
Thus uǫI(z) ≤ F (y) + O(ǫ). Continuing from z, player I cannot do better than uǫI(z),
hence E
[
F (xτ ) | xτF
] ≤ F (xτF ) +O(ǫ).
Summarizing the three cases, τF <∞ a.s., and
EF (xτF ) +O(ǫ) ≥ EF (xτ ),
hence F−(SFI ,SFII) ≥ F−(SI ,SII)−O(ǫ), as desired. 
Proposition 3.6. ‖wǫ − uǫ‖∞ = O(
√
ǫ).
Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 3.5, except that for case II we
use wǫ ≤ F (y)+O(√ǫ) from Lemma 3.4, and for case III we use uǫ ≥ vǫ ≥ F (y)−O(ǫ)
from Lemma 3.2. 
Corollary 3.7. If the odds function ρ(·) satisfies (1.3), then, for any ǫ > 0, the following
limits exist pointwise and are equal:
u˜ǫ,ρ := lim
n→∞
vǫ/2
n
= lim
n→∞
uǫ/2
n
= lim
n→∞
wǫ/2
n
.
Proof. By Lemma 3.1, either (vǫ/2
n
)n or (w
ǫ/2n)n is monotone. On the other hand, by
Lemmas 3.2 and 3.4, both sequences are bounded. Therefore, at least one of these
two limits exist pointwise. On the other hand, by Propositions 3.5 and 3.6, we have
‖vǫ/2n −wǫ/2n‖∞ → 0 as n→∞. Therefore, both sequences must converge to the same
pointwise limit. This is also the limit for uǫ/2
n
, since it is sandwiched between those two
sequences, by Lemma 3.1. 
Note that the uniform closeness of vǫ/2
n
and wǫ/2
n
does not imply automatically that
the limits in Corollary 3.7 hold in the sup-norm. Furthermore, at this point we do not
know yet if for different ǫ values and ρ(·) functions the limits u˜ǫ,ρ are the same.
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4. Comparison with exponential cones
Recall Definitions 1.1 and 1.2 from the Introduction. We will now show that the
value function uǫ almost satisfies comparison with β-exponential cones, and then that
any uniform limit satisfies CEC. We may assume β > 0. We will write the exponential
cones (1.5) centered at x0 in the form ϕ(x) = C(d(x, x0)), with C(r) = ae
−βr+b (positive
cones) or C(r) = aeβr + b (negative cones), where a ≤ 0 and b ∈ R.
Lemma 4.1. Let θ(·) satisfy θ(ǫ) ≤ βǫ/2 + O(ǫ2). Let z ∈ V ⊂⊂ X \ Y and write
Vǫ = {x : Bǫ(x) ⊂ V } for ǫ > 0 small enough. Let ϕ(x) = C(d(x, z)) be a β-exponential
cone centered at z. If uǫ ≤ ϕ on (V \ Vǫ) ∪ {z}, then uǫ ≤ ϕ + O(ǫM/s) on Vǫ, where
M := supY F − infY F and s := d(z, ∂V ).
Proof. Starting the game at x0 ∈ Vǫ, we need to give a strategy SII for player II such
that for any strategy SI of player I we have F+(SI ,SII) ≤ ϕ(x0) +O(ǫM/s).
First we suppose that ϕ is a positive cone. Note that infY F ≤ uǫ(z) ≤ ϕ(z), and that
we may assume that ϕ(z) ≤ supY F , since otherwise the result is trivial. We can replace
ϕ by a new cone that has the same value at z but is otherwise as small as possible (while
maintaining u ≤ ϕ on (V \ Vǫ) ∪ {z}); proving the result for this ϕ will suffice. Clearly,
the value of ϕ on ∂Bs−ǫ(z) is at most supY F . Now, writing C(r) = ae
−βr + b for this
ϕ, since the difference between the values at z and ∂Bs−ǫ(z) is at most M , we have
|a|(1− e−β(s−ǫ)) ≤M , hence |C ′(0)| = |a|β = O(M/s), after choosing ǫ < s/2 and using
s ≤ diamX . (Recall that O(·) is allowed to depend on X .)
Fix δ > 0, and let xk−1 ∈ Vǫ and r = d(xk−1, z). Let SII be the pull toward z
strategy: if r ≥ ǫ, then player II reduces the distance to z by almost ǫ, enough so
that C(d(xk, z)) < C(r − ǫ) + δ/2k; if r < ǫ, then player II moves to z; note that
C(0) < C(r − ǫ) +O(|a|βǫ) = C(r − ǫ) +O(ǫM/s) in this case. Then,
E[ϕ(xk)|Fk−1] < 1 + θ(ǫ)
2
C(r + ǫ) +
1− θ(ǫ)
2
(
C(r − ǫ) + δ
2k
+O(ǫM/s) 1{r<ǫ}
)
< ae−βr
(
1 + θ(ǫ)
2
e−βǫ +
1− θ(ǫ)
2
eβǫ
)
+ b+
δ
2k+1
+O(ǫM/s) 1{r<ǫ} .
By our assumption on θ(ǫ), we have 1+θ(ǫ)
2
e−βǫ + 1−θ(ǫ)
2
eβǫ ≥ 1−O(ǫ3). Recalling a ≤ 0,
this gives us
E[ϕ(xk)|Fk−1] < ae−βr + b+ δ
2k+1
− ae−βr O(ǫ3) +O(ǫM/s) 1{r<ǫ}
< ϕ(xk−1) +
δ
2k+1
+O(ǫ4M/s) +O(ǫM/s) 1{r<ǫ} . (4.1)
We let τ = inf
{
k : xk 6∈ Vǫ \ {z}
}
, and, for k ≤ τ , define
Mk := ϕ(xk) +
δ
2k
− O(ǫ3M/s) k − O(ǫM/s) 1{r<ǫ}
∣∣{j : 0 ≤ j < k and d(xj, z) < ǫ}∣∣ ,
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where the termsO(ǫ3M/s) andO(ǫM/s) are chosen larger than the similar terms in (4.1).
Hence Mk is a supermartingale. In order for this Mk to be useful, we need that we do
not lose much with these error terms until we reach τ . One might worry that having
the weaker player pull towards a target raises some complications here, but fortunately,
this is easily handled by X being compact in the path metric, as follows.
Due to the strategy SII , the number of j’s with d(xj , z) < ǫ is stochastically bounded
by an exponential random variable with a uniformly bounded expectation, as long as
(1 − θ(ǫ))/2 is bounded away from 0, which we may assume, since β > 0 is fixed
and ǫ → 0. Moreover, E[τ ] = O(ǫ−2) under this strategy, by the following argument.
The bias is only θ(ǫ) = O(ǫ), each step of player I increases the distance to z by at
most one step, and the distance from any x ∈ X \ Y to z is at most O(1/ǫ) steps,
therefore the time τ is stochastically dominated by the time it takes for a random
walk θ(ǫ)-biased to the right on the line segment {0, 1, . . . , O(1/ǫ)} to get from some
vertex i to 0. This has expectation O(ǫ−2), uniformly in the starting point i, as follows
e.g. from the commute time formula of electrical networks, see [LyP, Section 2.6] or
[Lov96, Section 4]. In our setting, if we consider the network on {0, 1, . . . , O(1/ǫ)} with
conductances C(j, j + 1) = ρj , then the effective resistance between vertex 0 and i is
R(0↔ i) =∑i−1j=0 ρ−j, and then the formula says
Eiτ0 + E0τi = 2R(0↔ i)
O(1/ǫ)∑
j=0
C(j, j + 1) = 2
i−1∑
j=0
O(1)
O(1/ǫ)∑
j=0
O(1) = O(ǫ−2) .
Since we have this uniformly in i, we also get P[τ > kǫ−2] < exp(−ck) for some c > 0.
On the other hand, ϕ(xk) is bounded. Thus Mk is uniformly integrable, and an
Optional Stopping Theorem [Dur96, Section 4.7] gives
E[ϕ(xτ )] < E[Mτ ] +O
(
(ǫ3−2 + ǫ)M/s
) ≤ E[M0] +O(ǫM/s) = ϕ(x0) + δ +O(ǫM/s) .
Since τ <∞ a.s. is clear from SII , we have xτ ∈ (V \Vǫ)∪{z}, so uǫ(xτ ) ≤ ϕ(xτ ), hence
uǫI(x0) ≤ supSI F−(SI ,SII) ≤ supSI EuǫI(xτ ) ≤ supSI Eϕ(xτ ) ≤ ϕ(x0) + δ + O(ǫM/s) for
any x0 ∈ Vǫ. Since δ was arbitrary, we have uǫ = uǫII ≤ ϕ+O(ǫM/s) on Vǫ, as claimed.
If C(r) = aeβr+b, then player II pulls away from z and the same equations result. 
Lemma 4.2. Let θ(·) satisfy θ(ǫ) ≥ βǫ/2 − O(ǫ2). Let z ∈ V ⊂⊂ X \ Y and write
Vǫ = {x : Bǫ(x) ⊂ V } for ǫ > 0 small enough. Let ϕ(x) := C(d(x, z)) be a β-exponential
cone centered at z. If uǫ ≥ ϕ on (V \ Vǫ) ∪ {z}, then uǫ ≥ ϕ − O(ǫM/s) on Vǫ, where
M := supY F − infY F and s := d(z, ∂V ).
Proof. It is the same as the proof of Lemma 4.1, we just have to reverse the roles of
players I and II and the direction of all the inequality signs. The bound E[τ ] = O(ǫ−2)
is even easier now, since the stronger player is pulling towards a target. 
We want to use the above approximate CEC lemmas for uǫ to prove that if they
converge to some u, then u satisfies CEC exactly. But in order to be able to apply these
lemmas, we need that if uǫ ≤ ϕ (or uǫ ≥ ϕ) on ∂V for V ⊂⊂ X \ Y , then this almost
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holds also in V \ Vǫ. This continuity property is actually a simple consequence of the
lemmas themselves:
Lemma 4.3 (Uniform Lipschitz away from Y ). Assume that |θ(ǫ)− βǫ/2| = O(ǫ2). Let
x1, x2 ∈ X \ Y with max{d(xi, Y )} = s. Recall M = supY F − infY F . Then, for any
ǫ > 0 with 2ǫ < min{d(xi, Y )}, we have |uǫ(x1)− uǫ(x2)| ≤ O (dǫ(x1, x2)M/s).
Proof. Assume d(x1, Y ) = s. Let V = (X \Y )ǫ, and take the positive β-exponential cone
ϕ(x) = C(d(x1, x)) centered at x1 with ϕ(x1) = u
ǫ(x1) and inf{ϕ(y) : y ∈ X \ Vǫ} =M .
Then C ′(0) = O(M/s), while, by Lemma 4.1, we have
uǫ(x2) ≤ ϕ(x2) +O(ǫM/s) ≤ ϕ(x1) + C ′(0) d(x1, x2) +O(ǫM/s)
≤ uǫ(x1) +O (dǫ(x1, x2)M/s) .
Similarly, from looking at a negative cone centered at x1 and Lemma 4.2, we obtain
that uǫ(x2) ≥ uǫ(x1)− O(dǫ(x1, x2)M/s), and we are done. 
Notice that we can now plug the Lipschitz bound of Lemma 4.3 into the proofs of
Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 to get the same results with V ⊂⊂ X \ Y , any z ∈ X \ Y inside or
outside V , and s = d(z, Y ).
With the help of the regularity provided by Lemma 4.3, we can now show that the
convergence in Corollary 3.7 is in fact uniform:
Theorem 4.4. If the odds function ρ(·) satisfies (1.3), then, for any ǫ > 0, we have the
uniform limits
u˜ǫ,ρ = lim
n→∞
vǫ/2
n
= lim
n→∞
uǫ/2
n
= lim
n→∞
wǫ/2
n
.
Proof. Using Lemmas 3.2 and 3.4 at Y , and Lemma 4.3 inside X \ Y , we get that the
sequence (uǫ/2
n
)n is uniformly bounded and “asymptotically uniformly equicontinuous”:
∀ η > 0 ∃ δ > 0 and N ∈ N such that whenever n > N and d(x, y) < δ for some x, y ∈ X ,
we have
∣∣uǫ/2n(x)− uǫ/2n(y)∣∣ < η. The proof of the Arzela`-Ascoli theorem goes through
for such sequences, and our underlying metric space X is compact, hence there is a
uniformly convergent subsequence of (uǫ/2
n
)n. Since the sequence has a pointwise limit,
this limit must be uniform, as well. By Propositions 3.5 and 3.6, the limits for (vǫ/2
n
)n
and (wǫ/2
n
)n are also uniform. 
We can also derive now the key property of subsequential uniform limits along any
subsequence ǫn ց 0:
Theorem 4.5. Any subsequential uniform limit u˜ = limn→∞ uǫn satisfies comparison
with β-exponential cones in X, and hence it is continuous on X.
Proof. Consider an open set V ⊂⊂ X \ Y with d(V, Y ) = s, and a β-exponential cone
ϕ centered at z ∈ X such that u˜ ≤ ϕ on ∂(V \ {z}). We must show that u˜ ≤ ϕ on
V . Fix δ > 0. For n large enough, uǫn ≤ u˜ + δ ≤ ϕ + δ on ∂V . For all x ∈ V \ Vǫn,
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there exists a y ∈ ∂V such that |x − y| < ǫn. Note that ϕ is uniformly continuous
on V , hence ϕ(y) ≤ ϕ(x) + δ if n is large enough. Also, by Lemma 4.3, we have
uǫn(x) ≤ uǫn(y) + O(ǫn · M/s), which is at most uǫn(y) + δ for sufficiently large n.
Summarizing, we have uǫn(x) ≤ uǫn(y) + δ ≤ ϕ(y) + 2δ ≤ ϕ(x) + 3δ for x ∈ V \ Vǫn.
By the extension of Lemma 4.1 mentioned after Lemma 4.3, uǫn almost satisfies com-
parison with the β-exponential cone ϕ+3δ from above, hence uǫn ≤ ϕ+3δ+O(ǫn ·M/s)
on V . Since δ was arbitrary, we have u˜ = limn→∞ uǫn ≤ ϕ on V .
The proof that u˜ satisfies comparison with β-exponential cones from below is the
same, except that the reference to Lemma 4.1 has to be replaced by Lemma 4.2.
That CEC implies the continuity of u˜ at points x ∈ X \ Y is clear by following the
proof of Lemma 4.3. Continuity at points x ∈ Y follows from Lemmas 3.2 and 3.4. 
5. Uniqueness
Let us give an outline of the strategy for proving uniqueness, which will be somewhat
similar to [PSSW09, Section 3.5]. If u is a continuous extension of F that satisfies com-
parison with β-exponential cones from above, then, provided that θ(ǫ) is large enough,
player I can more-or-less achieve a payoff u in the ǫ-game. Similarly, if u satisfies
CECB and θ(ǫ) is small enough, then player II can more-or-less achieve u in the ǫ-game.
Putting these two parts together, we get that if u satisfies CEC, and the bias is exactly
θ0(ǫ) = tanh(βǫ/2), then both players can almost achieve u; more precisely, we get
vǫ < u < wǫ. This implies that u = u˜ǫ,ρ0, for any ǫ. Therefore, all continuous CEC
extensions of F are the same.
Lemma 5.1. Let w : X −→ R be continuous and satisfy comparison with β-exponential
cones from above on X\Y . Suppose that θ(ǫ) satisfies 1
1+e−βǫ
≤ 1+θ(ǫ)
2
, and fix δ > 0.
Then, in I-favored tug-of-war, player I may play to make Mk∧τ a submartingale, where
Mk := w(xk)− δ/2k and τ := inf{k : d(xk, Y ) < 3ǫ}.
Proof. Let X3ǫ := {x ∈ X : d(x, Y ) ≥ 3ǫ}, and so τ is the time to exit X3ǫ. Let k ≤ τ ;
then xk−1 ∈ X3ǫ, and for player II’s proposal z = zk we have B2ǫ(z) ⊂ X\Y .
We need to show that E[M(xk)|zk,Fk−1] ≥ M(xk−1). We are not assuming that
suprema and infima of w over balls are achieved; however, player I may play so that
E[w(xk)|zk,Fk−1] > 1+θ(ǫ)2 supy∈B2ǫ(z)w(y) + 1−θ(ǫ)2 w(z)− δ2k . We let
p := sup
y∈B2ǫ(z)
w(y) and q :=
1 + θ(ǫ)
2
p+
1− θ(ǫ)
2
w(z) .
We will show using CECA that for all x ∈ Bǫ(z) we have q ≥ w(x). Since xk−1 ∈ Bǫ(z),
this will imply that E[w(xk)|zk,Fk−1] > q− δ2k ≥ w(xk−1)− δ2k and E[M(xk)|zk,Fk−1] >
w(xk−1)− δ2k − δ2k = Mk−1, as desired.
We know that w(z) ≤ supy∈B2ǫ(z) w(y) = p. First we notice that if w(z) = p then
q = p as well, and hence w(x) ≤ supy∈B2ǫ(z) w(y) = q for all x ∈ Bǫ(z), as we wished.
Next we assume that p > w(z). We let V := B2ǫ(z)\{z}. We will define a positive
exponential cone ϕ(x) = C(d(z, x)) centered at z, such that w(x) ≤ ϕ(x) on x ∈ ∂V . By
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CECA we will have that this inequality holds on all of V . In addition, the exponential
cone will be constructed so that ϕ(x) ≤ q on x ∈ ∂Bǫ(z). Since ϕ(x) is increasing in
distance from z, this will imply that for x ∈ Bǫ(z) we have w(x) ≤ ϕ(x) ≤ q, as desired.
To that end, we let C(r) := p−w(z)
1−e−2βǫ (1 − e−βr) + w(z). Notice that C(0) = w(z) and
C(2ǫ) = p, hence w(x) ≤ C(d(x, z)) on x ∈ ∂V . Furthermore, C(ǫ) = p−w(z)
1+e−βǫ
+ w(z) ≤
1+θ(ǫ)
2
(p − w(z)) + w(z) = q, by our assumption on θ(ǫ). Thus ϕ has all the desired
properties, and player I can play so that E[Mk|zk,Fk−1] ≥ Mk−1. 
Lemma 5.2. Suppose w : X −→ R is continuous, satisfies comparison with β-exponen-
tial cones from above on X\Y , and w ≤ F on Y . Let θ(ǫ) satisfy 1
1+e−βǫ
≤ 1+θ(ǫ)
2
. Then
wǫ ≥ w for all ǫ > 0, where wǫ is the value of the I-favored ǫ-game for player II.
Proof. Fix δ > 0, and let Mk, τ and X
3ǫ be as in Lemma 5.1. We know by that
lemma that player I can play such that E[Mk∧τ ] ≥ M0. Since we want to show that
infSII supSI F+(SI ,SII) ≥ w, we may assume that SI is the above strategy of player I,
while SII is a strategy that ensures that the game almost surely finishes (which exists
by Lemma 2.1). In particular, we may assume that τ <∞ a.s.
Now, wǫ(x0) ≥ E[wǫ(xτ ) − δ2−τ ] if xτ is reached under the above SI and an almost
optimal SII . On the other hand, wǫ(xτ ) − δ2−τ = w(xτ )− δ2−τ +
(
wǫ(xτ ) − w(xτ )
) ≥
Mτ − λǫ, where λǫ := supX\X3ǫ(w − wǫ). Now recall that E[Mτ ] ≥ M0 = w(x0) − δ.
Altogether, we get that wǫ(x0) > w(x0)− λǫ − δ.
Letting δ = ǫ, we have wǫ ≥ w − λǫ − ǫ. We will show in the next paragraph that
lim supǫց0 λǫ ≤ 0, hence letting ǫ → 0 gives that lim supǫց0wǫ ≥ w. We know that
wǫ ≤ w2ǫ, and so wǫ ≥ lim supǫ′ց0wǫ′ ≥ w, as desired.
Given any x ∈ X \ X3ǫ, let y ∈ Y be such that d(x, y) ≤ 3ǫ. Notice that a :=
(LipY F ) supy,y′∈Y
d(y,y′)
1−e−βd(y,y′) <∞ because Y is compact. Now let C(r) := a(1− e−βr) +
F (y), and ϕ(x) := C(d(x, y)), a β-exponential cone centered at y. Then, for y′ ∈ Y we
have ϕ(y′) ≥ (LipY F )d(y, y′) + F (y) ≥ F (y′) ≥ w(y′), where the last inequality is by
assumption. This implies ϕ ≥ w onX by comparison with exponential cones from above.
Thus w(x) ≤ ϕ(x) ≤ a(1 − e−3βǫ) + F (y). On the other hand, wǫ(x) ≥ F (y) − O(ǫ),
by wǫ(x) ≥ vǫ(x) and Lemma 3.2. Therefore, w(x) − wǫ(x) < a(1 − e−3βǫ) + O(ǫ) and
lim supǫց0 λǫ ≤ 0, as promised above. 
For functions satisfying CECB instead of CECA, we have the following analogue:
Lemma 5.3. Suppose that v : X −→ R is continuous, satisfies comparison with β-
exponential cones from below on X\Y , and v ≥ F on Y . Let θ(ǫ) satisfy 1
1+e−βǫ
≥ 1+θ(ǫ)
2
.
Then vǫ ≤ v for all ǫ > 0, where vǫ is the value of the II-favored ǫ-game for player I.
Proof. The analogue of Lemma 5.1 holds exactly, and then the proof of Lemma 5.2
can also be modified, the only difference being that the reference to Lemma 3.2 giving
wǫ(x) ≥ vǫ(x) ≥ F (y)− O(ǫ) has to be replaced by Lemma 3.4 giving vǫ(x) ≤ wǫ(x) ≤
F (y) +O(
√
ǫ). 
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We can now put together the pieces to prove our main result:
Proof of Theorem 1.3. By Theorem 4.4, if ǫ > 0 and ρ(·) satisfies (1.3), then the se-
quences uǫ/2
n
, vǫ/2
n
, wǫ/2
n
all converge uniformly to some u˜ǫ,ρ as n → ∞. By Theo-
rem 4.5, this u˜ǫ,ρ satisfies comparison with β-exponential cones, and is clearly an exten-
sion of F . On the other hand, if u is an extension that satisfies CEC, then playing the
favored ǫ-games with θ0(ǫ) = tanh(βǫ/2), Lemmas 5.2 and 5.3 give that v
ǫ ≤ u ≤ wǫ for
any ǫ > 0, hence u = u˜ǫ,ρ0, for any ǫ > 0. Consequently, all extensions u (in particular,
all limits u˜ǫ,ρ) are equal to each other. Finally, we get the uniform full convergence
‖uǫ − u‖∞ → 0 using the argument employed in Theorem 4.4: the entire family (uǫ)ǫց0
is uniformly bounded and asymptotically uniformly equicontinuous, hence any subse-
quence has a uniform limit; but we already know that there is a unique uniform limit,
so the entire sequence converges. 
6. Equivalence between viscosity solutions and CEC
We are going to study the β-biased infinity Laplacian equation (1.2) in Rn, which may
alternatively be written as
Φu := D2νu+ βDνu = 0, (6.1)
where ν := ∇u(x)/‖∇u(x)‖ is the unit gradient vector; for∇u(x) = 0 we define Φu(x) :=
0. This equation is quite degenerate, and it is not clear that the functions that one
would like to call solutions are actually differentiable even once. The notion of viscosity
solutions is a usual solution to this problem [CIL92].
Definition 6.1. Let U ⊆ Rn be a domain. An upper semicontinuous function u is a
viscosity solution of Φu ≥ 0 in U , or, in other words, a viscosity supersolution of (6.1),
if for every local maximum point x˜ ∈ U of u−w, where w is C2 in some neighbourhood
of x˜, we have Φw(x˜) ≥ 0. Similarly, a lower semicontinuous function u is a viscosity
solution of Φu ≤ 0, or viscosity subsolution of (6.1), if for every local minimum point
x˜ ∈ U of u−w we have Φw(x˜) ≤ 0. A function is a viscosity solution of Φu = 0 if it is
continuous and both a viscosity supersolution and subsolution.
We now prove Theorem 1.2. The idea of such a statement, together with the strategy
of the proof, come from [CEG01]; however, some of the details are quite different.
Proof of Theorem 1.2. We may assume that β > 0. We first prove that if u does not
satisfy CECA, then D2νu+ βDνu ≥ 0 does not hold in the viscosity sense.
Suppose we have some V ⊂⊂ U , x0 ∈ U , and a β-exponential cone (1.5) with ι ∈
{+,−}, such that u(x) ≤ Cιx0(x) + B ≡ C(‖x − x0‖) on x ∈ ∂(V \ {x0}), but ∃ x˜ ∈ V
with u(x˜) > Cιx0(x˜) + B. Then, for any smooth nonnegative function f : U −→ R, if
ǫ > 0 is small enough, then w(x) := Cιx0(x)+B+ ǫf(x) is a smooth function near x˜ that
satisfies u(x˜) > w(x˜), while u(x) ≤ w(x) on x ∈ ∂(V \ {x0}). Hence we may choose x˜
to be a local maximum of u−w. We want to find an f so that D2νw(x˜) + βDνw(x˜) < 0
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holds. We will of course search for an f of the form f(x) ≡ f0(‖x − x0‖). Then, for
‖x− x0‖ = r,
D2νw(x) + βDνw(x) =
{
ǫ
(
f ′′0 (r) + βf
′
0(r)
)
if C ′(r) + ǫf ′0(r) > 0;
ǫ
(
f ′′0 (r)− βf ′0(r)
)
if C ′(r) + ǫf ′0(r) < 0.
(6.2)
We now have to distinguish between the two cases ι ∈ {+,−}. Suppose first that
ι = +; thus C ′(r) = Aβe−βr > 0. Let R > 0 be so large that V ⊂ BR(x0), and f0 be
any smooth positive function with f ′0(r) < 0 and f
′′
0 (r) < 0 for all r ∈ (0, R). If ǫ > 0
is small enough, then C ′(r) + ǫf ′0(r) > 0 for all r ∈ (0, R). Then the LHS of (6.2) is
negative at x = x˜ ∈ V , as we wished.
The case ι = − is similar. Now C ′(r) < 0, so, if we choose f0 such that f ′0(r) > 0 and
f ′′0 (r) < 0, then, for ǫ > 0 small enough, C
′(r) + ǫf ′0(r) < 0 for all r ∈ (0, R), and hence
the LHS of (6.2) is again negative at x = x˜.
We show similarly that if u does not satisfy CECB, then it is not a viscosity subsolution
of (6.1). Suppose we have u(x) ≥ Cιx0(x) + B ≡ C(‖x − x0‖) on x ∈ ∂(V \ {x0}), but
∃ x˜ ∈ V with u(x˜) < Cιx0(x˜) +B. We now want w(x) := Cιx0(x) +B − ǫf(x) with f ≥ 0
and ǫ > 0 small, so that D2νw(x˜) + βDνw(x˜) > 0 holds. Writing f(x) ≡ f0(r),
D2νw(x) + βDνw(x) =
{
ǫ
(
f ′′0 (r)− βf ′0(r)
)
if C ′(r)− ǫf ′0(r) > 0;
ǫ
(
f ′′0 (r) + βf
′
0(r)
)
if C ′(r)− ǫf ′0(r) < 0.
(6.3)
One can easily see that if f0 is a smooth positive function with sgn f
′
0(r) = −ι and
f ′′0 (r) > 0 for all r ∈ (0, R), then the LHS of (6.3) is positive at x = x˜ ∈ BR(x0), as we
wanted.
Turning to the other direction of the equivalence claimed in Theorem 1.2, let us
assume that u is not a viscosity supersolution at u(0) = 0, where 0 ∈ U . That is,
there exists a C2 function w such that u(x) ≤ w(x) near 0, with equality at x = 0,
while D2νw(0)+βDνw(0) < 0. Since this inequality is invariant under rotations, we may
assume that ∇w(0) = (p, 0, . . . , 0) where p > 0. Then the inequality for w simply reads
as wx1,x1(0) + βp < 0. So let q := wx1,x1(0) < −βp < 0, and fix some further values
q < q˜ < q∗ < −βp. Writing x = x1e1 + y, with y being perpendicular to the unit vector
e1, for the Hessian matrix ∇2w(0) we have
〈∇2w(0)(x1e1 + y), x1e1 + y〉 ≤ qx21 +K(|x1|‖y‖+ ‖y‖2) ≤ q˜x21 + K˜‖y‖2,
with some constants K and K˜; the first inequality holds because the Hessian gives a
bounded bilinear operator, while the second holds because given ǫ > 0, there is a large
enough L such that xy + y2 < ǫx2 + Ly2 for all x, y > 0. From this and the Taylor
expansion of w(x) at x = 0, we get
u(x1, y) ≤ w(x1, y) ≤ px1 + 1
2
(
q˜x21 + K˜‖y‖2
)
+O(|x1|3 + ‖y‖3)
≤ px1 + q
∗
2
x21 +K
∗‖y‖2 =: G(x1, y) (6.4)
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in a neighborhood of (x1, y) = (0, 0), with some constant K
∗.
Consider the β-exponential cone ϕ(x) ≡ C+z (x) + B := A(1 − e−β‖x−z‖) + B, with
a choice of the centre z and the slope A that gives ∇ϕ(0) = Aβe−β‖z‖(−z/‖z‖) =
(p, 0, . . . , 0). In particular, z = (−z0, 0, . . . , 0) for some z0 > 0, and p = Aβe−βz0 .
Then easy calculus gives ∇2ϕ(0) = diag(−Aβ2e−βz0, Aβe−βz0/z0, . . . , Aβe−βz0/z0) =
diag(−βp, p
z0
, . . . , p
z0
), a diagonal matrix.
We made this choice for ϕ because G(x1, y) has now the same gradient (p, 0, . . . , 0)
at (x1, y) = (0, 0) as ϕ, while its Hessian is ∇2G(0) = diag(q∗, 2K∗, . . . , 2K∗), with
q∗ < −βp. Note that, in defining the cone ϕ, we still have a freedom of choice in z0 and
in B. We take z0 smaller than the distance of 0 from ∂U , and also so small that p/z0 is
much bigger than 2K∗, and then choose A to make p = Aβe−βz0 . Then we take B such
that ϕ(0, 0) < G(0, 0), but their difference is very small even compared to (βp− q∗)z0.
Then, if we take the Taylor series of ϕ − G around (0, 0), the first derivatives are 0,
but the second derivatives, both in the x1 and the other directions, are positive enough
compared to how little bit negative ϕ − G at (0, 0) is, to ensure that at the boundary
of the ball of radius z0 around (0, 0) we have ϕ − G > 0. That is, for V := Bz0(0), we
have u(x) ≤ w(x) ≤ G(x) < ϕ(x) for x ∈ ∂V , while u(0) = w(0) = G(0) > ϕ(0), hence
CECA fails for u.
The proof that if u is not a viscosity subsolution, then CECB fails, is almost identical
to the above. We only need to change the direction of all the inequality signs, and thus
can construct a negative cone for which CECB fails. 
7. Concluding remarks and open problems
Explicit biased infinity harmonic functions. There are only few explicit infinity
harmonic functions known even in the unbiased case: in two dimensions, u(x, y) =
|x|4/3 − |y|4/3 is one example, the argument function in a sector (in polar coordinates,
u(r, φ) = φ) is another. See [Aro86, PSSW09] for further examples. For the biased case,
it remains a challenge to give any genuinely non-1-dimensional example. For instance,
it is not difficult to show that in a sector, with constant 0 and 1 boundary values on the
bounding half-infinite rays, no extension can be just a function of the angle φ.
Even if we do not have explicit solutions, we could have an efficient algorithm to
compute the unique extension numerically. In the unbiased case, using the absolutely
minimizing Lipschitz property, there is a simple algorithm computing the discrete in-
finity harmonic extension on a finite graph, in polynomial time in the size of the graph
[LLPU96, LLPSU99]. The same idea can be used to approximate continuum solutions
in Rn [Obe05]. However, we do not know of anything like that in the biased case.
Uniqueness questions. In what generality does uniqueness hold? For example, what
happens if U = X\Y is a bounded domain in Rn, butX is compact only in the Euclidean
metric, not in the path metric? Or is there a unique extension in a sector of any angle,
with constant 0 and 1 boundary values on the bounding half-infinite rays?
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When X is an arbitrary length space, Y ⊂ X is closed, and F is a bounded Lipschitz
function on Y , there might be several bounded continuous extensions satisfying CEC,
but, when β > 0, the “smallest” extension seems to be more canonical than the others.
Is the pointwise infimum of all bounded CEC extensions finite and also a CEC extension?
(For β < 0 we should take the pointwise supremum.) A simple example is the half-line
X = [0,∞) with Y = {0} and F (0) = 0, mentioned after Theorem 1.1. There are
infinitely many viscosity solutions, or equivalently, CEC extensions here, with pointwise
infimum u(x) ≡ 0. Now, if we strengthen Definition 1.2 for CEC to include comparison
over all open subsets V ⊂ V ⊂ X \ Y (bounded or not), then u(x) ≡ 0 becomes the
unique such extension. This “best” extension is also singled out from the point of view
of the game: it is easy to see that uǫI(x) ≡ 0 and uǫII(x) ≡ +∞ for all ǫ > 0, hence
the game does not have a value in the strong sense we used in this paper, but there
are some natural weaker versions according to which there is a value, uǫ(x) ≡ 0. For
example, in the definition of uǫII , we could take the sup only over such strategies SI
for which there exists some SII terminating the game almost surely, because we should
not punish player II with a payoff +∞ for player I forcing the game not to terminate.
(There would be a similar change in the definition of uǫI , as well.) Another solution is
to assign a payoff L ∈ [−∞,∞] to any non-terminating game play. This game will have
a value function uǫL(x), which is constant 0 for all L ≤ 0, and some larger L-dependent
CEC function when L > 0, so the L ≤ 0 case may be called canonical.
So, we have the natural questions: in what domains is it true that the pointwise
infimum is the unique extension that satisfies the stronger CEC condition, moreover, is
the ǫ→ 0 limit of value functions in some or most of the weaker senses?
Regularity of solutions. A major open problem in the unbiased case is whether
infinity harmonic functions in Rn are in the class C1; see [CEG01, CE01, EY05]. For
topological reasons, the understanding is better in dimension 2, where solutions are
known to be in C1,α [Sav05, ES], for some α > 0. One cannot expect a much stronger
result, such as C2, as shown by the example |x|4/3−|y|4/3. All these proofs use comparison
with cones; it would be worth examining how much goes through to the biased case,
using comparison with exponential cones. Do we have better or worse regularity than
in the unbiased case?
Expected duration of game. Given X compact in the path metric, in the un-
biased ǫ-game, if both players play optimally, then the “local variation” δ+(xn) =
supy∈B(xn,ǫ) u
ǫ(y) − uǫ(xn) is non-decreasing in n, and thus it is not hard to see that
the expected duration of the game is OX(ǫ
−2). However, it is much less clear that a
player can achieve an (almost) optimal payoff within a similar expected time, regard-
less of what the other player does. This is closely related to a PDE stability question;
let us formulate the exact connection in the unbiased case, where more information is
available.
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In [PSSW09], the ǫ-game with running payoff was introduced: in addition to our
usual data X, Y, F , we have a continuous f : X −→ R, and the payoff for player I, if the
game ends at step τ , is F (xτ ) + ǫ
2
∑τ−1
i=0 f(xi). It was shown that if X is compact, F is
Lipschitz on Y , and minX f > 0 or maxX f < 0, then the ǫ-game has a value u
ǫ, which
converges uniformly to a continuous function u that is the unique viscosity solution of
the inhomogeneous equation ∆∞u = f , with boundary condition u
∣∣
Y
= F .
Proposition 7.1. Assume that X, Y, F are as in the previous paragraph. Then the
following are equivalent:
(1) For any δ, ǫ > 0, in the standard ǫ-tug-of-war, player I has a strategy that achieves
a payoff at least uǫ − δ starting from any position x0 ∈ X \ Y , and the expected
duration of the game is at most Cδǫ
−2.
(2) If fk is continuous with minX fk > 0 for all k ∈ N, converging uniformly to 0 as
k →∞, then the viscosity solutions uk to ∆∞uk = fk converge uniformly to the
solution of ∆∞u = 0, with boundary value F .
Proof. Assuming (1), fix a small δ > 0, then choose η > 0 smaller than δ/Cδ. If k
is large enough, then η > fk > 0. The reflected version of (1) tells us that, in the
standard ǫ-game, player II can make sure that the payoff is at most uǫ+δ, and the game
finishes within expected time Cδǫ
−2. The exact same strategy in the game with running
payoff fk guarantees that the expected total payoff is at most u
ǫ + δ + Cδη < u
ǫ + 2δ,
independently of the starting position. On the other hand, the running payoff favors
player I, hence the total expected payoff is certainly at least uǫ. This, together with the
result we quoted from [PSSW09], establishes (2).
Assume now (2). Let fk ≡ 1/k, fix any δ > 0, and let k be large enough such that
the viscosity solution uk satisfies ‖uk − u‖∞ < δ. Now, if ǫ > 0 is small enough, then
the value function uǫk of the ǫ-game with running payoff fk satisfies ‖uǫk − uk‖∞ < δ,
again by [PSSW09]. Furthermore, if ǫ > 0 is small enough, then the value function uǫ is
closer than δ to the viscosity solution u. Altogether, if k is large and then ǫ > 0 is small,
then ‖uǫk − uǫ‖∞ < 3δ. Therefore, there is a strategy for player II that guarantees that
the payoff in the ǫ-game with running payoff fk is at most u
ǫ + 4δ. Since the running
payoff favors player I, the same strategy achieves a payoff at most uǫ+4δ in the standard
ǫ-game. (Starting with the reflected version of (2), we get a good strategy for player I.)
Now, what is the expected duration of this game?
Since F is continuous on the compact set Y , and u is continuous on the compact set
X , both are bounded in absolute value, say, by C <∞. Hence |uǫ| is bounded by C+ δ,
and our strategy guarantees that the payoff in the ǫ-game with running payoff fk is at
most C + 5δ. But then the payoff collected from the running payoff must be at most
2C + 5δ, hence the expected duration of this game can be at most (2C + 5δ)ǫ−2k. This
implies claim (1) with a constant Cδ = (2C + 5δ)k, where k = k(δ). 
Very recently, Lu and Wang proved part (2) with PDE methods, when X is the closure
of a bounded domain in Rn [LuW]. It would be interesting to see a probabilistic proof
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of (1). More importantly, no such bound is known for the biased case, not even Cδǫ
−γ ,
with any exponent γ <∞ in place of 2.
A polynomial bound on the expected duration would be helpful, for instance, in giving
a polynomial time approximation scheme to compute biased infinity harmonic functions.
Let us finally note that if we had such a bound, then we would not need to be so
careful in Section 5 and consider the ǫ-game with exactly θ(ǫ) = tanh(βǫ/2): if the
game does not last long, then small errors in the super- or sub-martingality could not
add up to too much. We used a similar argument in Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, but there we
did not have to bound the time till the very end of the game.
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